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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

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February 23, 1988

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel William M. Matz, Jr.
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

Mr. Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

[Redacted]
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

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SUBJECT: Comments on INF and START Verification Testimony which
was given before the SSCI on February 19, 1988

Attached are comments by Assistant Director M. Eimer on
Mr. Richard Perle and Mr. Walter Slocombe's testimony before the
SSCI on February 19, 1988, on INF and START Treaty Verification.

These comments will be presented before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on February 24, 1988. I would
appreciate it if you would provide your comments/clearance to
Bob Summers (647-8091) by OOB Wednesday, February 24, 1988. (U)

for Jimmie L. Pickford
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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COMMENTS BY
DR. MANFRED EIMER
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF VERIFICATION AND INTELLIGENCE
THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
BEFORE THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ON
START AND INF TREATY VERIFICATION
FEBRUARY 24, 1988

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Comments on INF and START Verification Testimony
which was given before the SSCI on February 19, 1988

During the Treaty verification hearings before the SSCI on February 19, 1988, Mr. Richard Perle and Mr. Walter Slocombe provided testimony on the INF and START Treaties. I would like to comment on their testimony.

In his testimony Mr. Perle indicated that it was his judgment that the provision in the INF Treaty effectively banning all INF GLCMs (conventional as well as nuclear) was a mistake. He believes that the U.S. needs the right to have conventionally armed GLCMs in the INF range (500-5500 km). To accomplish this end, he proposes that an amendment be made to Article II, paragraph 2 of the INF Treaty adding the word "nuclear". He asserts that this would not be a "killer" amendment since the existing definition was based on U.S. language on which the Soviets expressed no strong views. (S)

Unfortunately, we know of no satisfactory means by which to effectively verify a nuclear GLCM ban since we cannot distinguish a nuclear from a conventional GLCM. While direct sensing techniques exist that allow a side to determine the nature of the warhead if the inspector is in proximity to an unshielded missile, the fundamental problem remains that such OSI is valid only at the time and place of the inspection. Even

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if a side complied with its treaty commitments during a peacetime OSI regime (i.e., those missiles credited with conventional warheads are always deployed with conventional warheads), modern weapons design allows rapid switching of warheads during a crisis, thus affording the side a significant breakout potential. (S)

In addition to this fundamental problem, other problems exist with attempts to distinguish warheads: the direct sensing techniques can be circumvented; on-site inspection of mobile weapons platforms can be extremely disruptive to normal operational security; and the potential for Soviet acquisition of sensitive weapons design information certainly exists. To summarize, treaty provisions that create a distinction between nuclear and conventional warheads on the same delivery vehicle are unverifiable and present significant security risks to the US. On the other hand, they do allow the US to develop conventional weapons to replace those types eliminated in both INF and START. (S)

Thus, in order to preserve a conventional GLCM option for the U.S., we would have to permit the Soviets to "legally" develop and test and, ultimately, to possess an unlimited number of "conventional" GLCMs; and we would have no satisfactory means for verifying that these GLCMs were conventional, rather than nuclear. Thus, the Soviets could deploy an unlimited number of nuclear-capable GLCMs without giving us any basis for judging non-compliance with the INF Treaty.

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Thus, in effect, we would be banning only our nuclear GLCMs but with no control over the Soviet nuclear GLCM deployment. (S)

Mr. Slocombe expressed concern regarding the warhead limits for strategic missiles agreed upon at the Washington Summit. He believes that these numbers tend to undercount RV loading. In particular, he questioned the low number allocated to the Soviet SS-N-23 (four). (S)

A key theme that cuts across all of START verification is the requirement that we limit the potential capability of strategic systems as well as their numbers. This requirements is essential because both sides are allowed to deploy new types of weapons in addition to those types existing at the time of treaty signature. The two most significant examples of limiting capability are the definition of accountable ballistic missile throw-weight and the counting rule for ballistic missile RVs. (S)

There are difficult problems associated with qualitative limits on systems capability, however. On one hand, if we capture the full capability of a system, we are likely to overcount its operational or military utility. On the other hand, if we fail to limit capability, we sacrifice verifiability because we are likely to undercount actual system capability. Undercounting a system's capability also leads to concern about breakout. For example, if the US were to accept an RV-counting rule, that is based on the number of RVs released during

flight-testing, we would be relying on soviet demonstrations of capability. Unfortunately, a side does not have to test a ballistic missile with its full complement of RVs to be fully confident in its performance and reliability. (S)

It is important, first of all, to note that the RV-loadings agreed at the Washing Summit were for existing missiles only. The allowable RV limits for future systems will be determined by a rule yet to be agreed upon. The US position on this issue has not yet been determined. It is hoped that this rule for future systems (when proposed by the US and accepted by the Soviets) will capture potential RV-loading capability. (S)

The RV loading rules provided by the Washington Summit are, in any event, under review. (S)

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